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Abstract
Faced with the facts of economic inequality, the wealthy are confronted with a particular set of moral,
social, and political questions, not least of which is the question of how to preserve a sense of being a
“good” human being. In the case of justifying privilege, the problem becomes how to position oneself
as being uniquely able to enact a superior moral character. In this response to Swalwell’s article, we
argue that her data show how being good and having moral standing is a social outcome that is premised on the unequally distributed ability to do certain things, to enact certain roles, and to mobilize
particular discourses. Swalwell demonstrated the complicated ways in which privileged students
understand what it means to have a commitment to social justice, and her analysis raises questions
about the possibility of as well as the potential for educating students with economic privilege toward
social justice commitments. In this response we highlight the important symbolic role that economically disadvantaged groups play in the imaginary of students who attend elite private schools and
what this illustrates about the ways in which they are complicit in sustaining social inequality.
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task of convincing everyone—especially themselves—of the
legitimacy of their class interests in order to preserve their power.
To do this, the wealthy are confronted with a particular set of
moral, social, and political questions, not least of which is the
question of how to preserve a sense of being a “good” human being.
In the case of justifying privilege, the problem becomes how to

Late at night, with TV’s hungry child;
his belly swells.
Well, for the price of a coke, or a smoke,
I could keep alive those hungry eyes.
Man, take a look again;
everyday things change, oh,
but basically you and me stay the same.
—“Seek Up,” Dave Matthews

The United States of America was founded on an
antiaristocratic conception of democracy based on equal opportunity. Yet the fact that social and economic advantages enable some
people to both further and ensure their economic wealth runs
against the most basic assumption of such a conception, that those
who succeed do so out of their own skill and hard work. When
doubts arise about such assumptions, the wealthy are faced with the
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position oneself as being uniquely able to enact a superior moral
character. What is more complicated and must remain hidden is
that the very ability to enact good citizenship and moral character
is premised on the economic and social advantages that such
enactments justify. Being good and having moral standing is a
social outcome that is premised on the unequally distributed
ability to do certain things, to enact certain roles, and to mobilize
particular discourses.
It may seem counterintuitive that economically advantaged
individuals would be concerned with and committed to social and
economic justice, since they are the ones who benefit most from
inequality. Since social justice efforts are commonly understood as
a challenge to economically privileged groups in order to increase
the representation and empowerment of oppressed groups, it
might seem strange that people with economic privilege would
support such efforts. Such commitments might seem even stranger
if we consider that people with economic privilege often have
limited opportunities for direct contact and experiences with
individuals outside of their class context. They also tend to lack an
analysis of their own privilege and how it is related to the oppression suffered by disadvantaged groups (Stuber, 2010; Wildman,
1996). In fact, individuals with economic privilege have little
awareness of economic oppression and sometimes deny that it
even exists, instead blaming the poor for their circumstances
(Johnson, 2001; Lazarre, 1996; Sleeter, 2000). While these various
factors could easily support the ostensibly common sense assumption that privileged people are unlikely to support social justice
efforts, what is more interesting is the fact that they often do.
Indeed, in so-called capitalist democracies like the United States, a
commitment to the improvement of the lives of the disadvantaged—at least in rhetoric—is crucial to the public image of
economically privileged groups.
These commitments are not always understood as social
justice, a phrase that is often associated with leftist and progressive
politics. At the same time, because justice and being just have a
common genealogy with notions of being right and moral authority, justifying privilege is always wrapped within a conception of
justice and moral character. Understanding how economically
privileged individuals make sense of justice in general and social
justice in particular reveals a great deal about their self-
construction as “good” people. An analysis of privilege reveals a
great deal about how much privilege is defined through its lack.
The wealthy need the poor, not only because their abundance in
part produces poverty but also because the poor play a critical
symbolic and affective role in how the wealthy understand
themselves. Like the hungry African child on the television who
must be kept alive for the entertainment of late-night infomercial
viewers across the United States, the poor must be kept poor so that
the rich always have someone upon whom to enact their self-
righteousness.
It is here that Swalwell’s analysis in her article (2013), “‘With
Great Power Comes Great Responsibility’: Privileged Students’
Conceptions of Justice-Oriented Citizenship,” sheds some fascinating light. Exploring how privileged adolescents respond to
educational efforts encouraging them to become justice oriented
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reveals a great deal about the fact that equity and justice are
important themes in the self-construction of some wealthy elites.
Swalwell demonstrated the complicated—although not all that
surprising—ways in which these privileged students understand
what it means to have a commitment to social justice. Her analysis
raises questions about the possibility of as well as the potential for
educating students with economic privilege toward social justice
commitments.
Implied throughout Swalwell’s article is the assumption that
to be justice oriented, whatever it entails, is one way in which
individuals demonstrate their “good moral character.” The assumption that to be a “good citizen” is also to be a “good person” is
embedded in the framework of civic education through which she
examined these students’ conceptions of social justice. Surely one
would expect privileged individuals who identify as justice
oriented, as do the adolescents in Swalwell’s study, to express
concern for others’ interests. Yet what stands out from the data
presented is the students’ concern with presenting themselves as
good people with good moral character.
As both of us have demonstrated elsewhere, part of what
motivates privileged adolescents to engage in benevolent acts,
especially community service activities, is the ability to present
themselves to others as caring, engaged, and generous (Howard,
2010). Their involvement in benevolent acts serves not only as a
useful way of forming a more positive self-image but also has
considerable ideological value in diverting attention away from
their privileged circumstances. Their benevolent acts place them in
a positive light while serving to protect, rationalize, and legitimize
their advantages (Gaztambide-Fernández, 2011). More specifically,
these youths use a variety of ideological frames and operations in
describing their involvement in community service to rationalize
their schooling and life advantages, construct between-class
divisions, and establish within-class solidarity.
Again, this is not to say that the students interviewed by
Swalwell do not care for those who suffer from the consequences of
economic inequality and are simply motivated by a rational
calculation to present themselves as good people. Rather, what we
want to underscore here is the important symbolic role that
economically disadvantaged groups play in the imaginary of
students who attend elite private schools such as Kent Academy.
While we value Swalwell’s argument regarding the disjuncture
between the aims of justice-oriented programs and how the
students themselves understand their own commitments to social
justice, we want to suggest that such a disjuncture is not only
unsurprising but also predictable. These differing views of what it
means to be justice oriented share in common the fact that they are
all manifestations of the ways in which the complicity of economically advantaged students is deferred to the very moment in which
they declare a commitment to social justice, however construed. At
that moment, and particularly in the context of an elite school
committed to social justice, the suffering of the poor becomes the
fodder through which these students enact a sense of moral
standing. Gaztambide-Fernández (2009a) argued that such
“deferred complicity” becomes evident in those cathartic moments
when our sense of what it means to be a “normal” person is
article response

2

reflected back to us through an oblique recognition of “other
people’s suffering” (p. 41).
Each of the “performative identities” that Swalwell described
provides evidence of the ways in which the poor constitute a key
signifier through which the wealthy justify their own privilege and
come to see themselves as good people. First, for those who espouse
a meritocratic outlook, other people’s suffering is a confirmation
that they are worthy of their privilege because they worked hard.
Positioning themselves as part of the solution through acts of
charity, the meritocratic logic mobilizes other people’s suffering as a
way to construct a self that is caring, knowledgeable, and cosmopolitan. At the most egregious level, knowledge of other peoples’
suffering becomes material for sounding “really cool,” as one
student put it (p. 5), and for appearing informed and well educated.
Second, the Benevolent Benefactor frame positions elites as the
moral authority, “as a model toward which those with less should
strive,” as Swalwell explained (p. 6). Such “benefactors” confirm
their status by engaging in acts that corroborate their superiority
over those without privilege, without whom benevolence—as part
of what it means to be a good person—cannot be enacted. The poor,
of course, can never achieve such moral standing, precisely because
what defines them as poor is the lack of the very economic
resources that allow wealthy benefactors to enact their moral
character.
In the third instance, the very possibility of “opting out”
(p. 5), as one participant put it, and becoming resigned to the fact of
inequality in the comfort of an elite school is an option that only
economic privilege can afford. As Nietzsche (1996) argued, the kind
of ascetic ideal expressed through the image of someone like Henry
David Thoreau is itself the product of a process of moral self-
constitution that further obscures the power of economic privilege.
Such a position is not all that surprising. Even when people from
privileged groups have an awareness of oppression and see the need
for social justice work, they may feel that it is useless to try to
change things or that there is little they can do. They may feel
inadequate, powerless, overwhelmed, or hopeless to bring about
change (Goodman, 2001). Such feelings are akin to the kind of
paralyzing “White guilt” that many Whites experience when they
become aware of how they are implicated in racism and benefit
from White supremacy. And like White guilt, the move toward
resignation once again underscores the economic privilege implied
in having that option.
At the opposite end of the Resigned, Swalwell described the
frame of the Activist Ally as the one that “is best suited” (p. 7) to the
conception of justice-oriented citizenship that Westheimer and
Kahne (2004) argued is most consistent with a social justice
education. Clearly this is Swalwell’s preferred position, and the one
she wants to promote as the desirable outcome of a social justice
education for students with economic privilege. We do not
necessarily disagree, but we want to caution that such a frame is not
innocent and is also implied in the kind of deferred (while differed)
complicity in other people’s suffering that is more evident in the
previous frames. The students who embrace this frame describe a
desire for being with the people, talking to and getting to know the
poor and their needs. Once again, such desires are wrapped in a
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conception of the wealthy as moral and deserving, which requires
suffering others (i.e., “the people”) as a way to enact “good citizenship.” In a sense, this is articulated at the level of the school, since
the very reputation of the Kent Academy as a justice-oriented, elite,
private school rides on the fact that it caters to the academic, social
and, in the end, moral needs of those who can afford to attend such
a school. This is not really paradoxical, as Swalwell suggested; the
school, and its students, builds an identification as a “good school”
and as “good citizens” on the backs of the very people whose lives
they presumably want to change but without whom they would
have no referent for self-definition. The hungry child must be kept
alive, “but basically you and me stay the same.”
Swalwell seemed to project her own hopes on the words of
students like Dylan and Cora, and in doing so ended up claiming
more than the data make apparent, suggesting that they engage in
practices informed by “an iterative relationship between thinking
and doing that loops knowledge and understanding with action”
(p. 7). Yet we know nothing about whether and how these students
actually do anything to practice what they seem to preach or
whether and how anything they do yields “mutual transformation
and societal improvement” (p. 6). We can assume, however, that
their college applications will be filled with statements about their
concern for the well-being of others as they craft the kind of
admissions profile that will yield an equally elite college education
(Stevens, 2007; see also Gaztambide-Fernández, 2011).
Brantlinger (2003) pointed out that in democracies, “dominant groups must have some degree of permission from subordinates to exert control over them; that consensus is achieved by
circulating ideologies that obfuscate the rankings and power imbalances that work against equity for peripheral groups” (pp. 5–6).
This projection of self as justice oriented, therefore, has considerable ideological value—in diverting attention away from the power
of dominant groups and convincing subordinates that they are
concerned for others and are compassionate, kind, and giving. Such
ideological messages that place the wealthy in a positive light
protect their class interests and power, raising questions about
whether and how individuals with economic privilege can ever be
effectively involved in social justice efforts and what their role
should be. On the one hand, it may be that providing access to the
economic resources necessary to support social justice efforts is
reason enough to persist in instilling justice-oriented values on
young elites (Brantlinger, 2003; Goodman, 2001). On the other
hand, if providing such resources only serves to reinforce the
hierarchical positioning of wealthy elites as morally superior and as
capable of enacting the ultimate form of good citizenship by
becoming allies with the poor, fundamental social change is highly
unlikely.
Swalwell noted that there are also subjective reasons why
economically privileged students should engage in social justice
work and embrace an “activist ally” conception of citizenship.
“Improving their own lives” (p. 6) is part of what is at stake for these
privileged youths as they are also “dehumanized by injustice” (p. 7).
We agree that inequality and economic oppression have a deleterious effect on everyone involved. However, we are suspicious of the
conceptions of what it means to be human that are reinforced when
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elites enact a particular version of “good citizenship” by engaging
in social justice work. Seeking self-improvement through what
Chouliaraki (2011) called “ironic” solidary efforts runs the risk of
becoming “a matter of crafting artful stories that situate the self at
the heart of their communicative structure” (p. 370). While
ostensibly about activism, such efforts really have at stake the
moral salvation of economically privileged individuals without any
significant change in the very material conditions that enable them
to engage as allies in the first place.
In some sense, what this means is that we need to pay particular attention to what we mean by activism when we examine
privileged individuals’ commitments toward social justice. This is
especially important given that there is always an element of
asserting oneself in activism by assuming roles based on the sense
of entitlement that elites internalize through their schooling
(Gaztambide-Fernández, 2009b). Unless economically privileged
individuals are willing to examine their sense of entitlement and
challenge their own privileged ways of knowing and doing, being
in solidarity with less fortunate others will remain about improving
themselves. At an institutional level, this means that schools like
the Kent Academy would have to put their very reputations—along
with their economic privilege—on the line by becoming not just
more diverse, as Swalwell suggested, but by shifting the very fabric
of privilege that clothes their elite reputations.
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